

**Abstract****Images and Othering: Witches, Natives, Europeans**

Image is a world that includes both otherness and sameness. Image gets its context from the visions and the ideas by means of copy, likeness, representation, picturing and dreaming. At the same time images are so social and cultural that they can also cause stigmatization. Images can be considered in the context of identity components like identification, self-identification and of othering, segregation and differentiation. This study aims to compare the European ideas about witchcraft and the appearances, beliefs and lives of the New World's native people in the context of imagination. This comparison reveals an imaginative analogy between the mental images of Europeans and the cultures of native people of the New World. Thus, this study "reads" the differentiation of the Others through the mental images of Europeans who met with many different native tribes by the [re] discovery of the New World.

**Key Words:**

Image, the other, otherness, Europeans.

**About the Author**

*Z. Nilüfer Nahya* is an independent researcher of ethnology and social anthropology. She received her doctorate in 2010 from the Ethnology Program of the Department of Folklore in Ankara University. Her areas of interest include images and othering in different cultures within the context of identity, religious conversion, and religious minorities in Turkey.

**Yazar Hakkında**

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## rom the Theory of Consent to the Theatre of Conflict: Theoretical Perspectives on the Changing Character of the Modern State

**Idowu William**

*Department of Philosophy, Obafemi Awolowo University.*

**Abstract**

The concept of the state is a central and cardinal subject matter in political and philosophical thoughts. However, there are different and conflicting perceptions concerning both the historical and contemporary realities around the state. This paper addresses one important aspect of the contemporary perceptions concerning the state. The paper argues that even though the modern state, theoretically, grew out of the idea of a contract or theory of consent, as expounded by classical philosophers and theorists, its present and contemporary status seems to be enraptured in a lingering sense of conflicts and contradictions. The paper discovers that the idea of citizenship, the multicultural and plural elements in most societies, the high rate of global migration, the politics and philosophy of multinational expansions, the transition of the nation-state into a market state with an undue endorsement of capitalism and the reverberations of globalisation are all corroborative of the conflict-ridden and contradictory nature of the modern state especially in Third World countries. The paper concludes that the conflictual and contradictory trappings around the modern state cannot be explained outside the historical conditions that have influenced its emergence including the factors highlighted above.

**Keywords**

State, contract, consent, conflict, human nature

## Introduction

That there are different theories and conceptions of the state is not just a mere fruitless and worthless academic exercise; the different theories and conceptions actually picture the fact that the state and its understanding cannot be described using just one linguistic, ideological and phenomenological apparatus alone. In a way, those different theories lend credence to the terse but profound statement that diversity is an inescapable fact of the universe. In fact, the different theories only legitimate the view that the state has become an important aspect of human existence. As argued by Andrew Heywood (2004, 75), “so powerful and extensive is the modern state that its nature has become the centrepiece of political argument and ideological debate.” In my view, part of the reasons why the state has become the centrepiece of philosophical debates could be attributed to what Ralph Miliband said almost forty years ago, a pronouncement that is still valid despite decades after its initial utterance. According to Miliband (1973, 1):

More than ever before men now live in the shadow of the state. What they want to achieve, individually or in groups, now mainly depends on the state’s sanction and support. But since that sanction and support are not bestowed indiscriminately, they must, ever more directly, seek to influence and shape the state’s power and purpose, to try to appropriate it altogether. It is for the state’s attention, or its control, that men compete; and it is against the state that beat the waves of social conflict. It is to an ever greater degree the state which men encounter as they confront other men...it is possible not to be interested in what the state does; but it is not possible to be unaffected by it.

Considered in the light of this prophetic pronouncement, it is no wonder that J. W. Garner (1932) contended that political science begins and ends with the state. What is worrisome, however, is the fact that even though scholars are agreed on the significance of the state, yet, what its actual nature and specific character is has not only been different but equally controversial. A quite perceptive capture of this controversy can be seen in David Easton’s philosophical evaluation of the different views on the state. According to David Easton (1953),

One person sees the state as the embodiment of the moral spirit, its concrete expression; another, as the instrument of exploitation used by one class against others. One author defines it as simply an aspect of society, distinguishable from it only analytically; another, as simply a synonym for government; and still another, as a separate and unique association among a large number of other associations such as the church, trade unions, and similar voluntary groups.

For Easton, just one entity attracts conflicting perceptions which means, according to Easton, either that the entity in question cannot be quantified, epistemologically, or is, altogether, a myth. Yet, the whole of politics, as a science, is said to revolve around the state. So, when philosophers and political theorists pay attention to the epistemology of the state, it appears very clear that they seem to be in pursuit of something even if one cannot exactly say that something is actually pursuing those whose interests are actuated by the

need to know what the state is. What is somewhat certain is that Easton’s very careful observation about state theory and theorisation carries a sense of validity in terms of the perceived presence of theory conflicts and conflict of theories.

It is this conflicting tendency in the characterisation and conception of the state that, perhaps, prompted Sushila Ramaswamy (2006, 87) to contend that the modern state is highly differentiated, specialised and complex upholding the difference between the private and public space. The complexity alluded to is not just contingent on the different possibilities ingrained in the functions it performs contemporarily but in the fact that its ancient as well as its contemporary theoretical historicity are both subjects of lingering controversies. But a very reasonable question to pose is: if philosophers are divided in their theorisation about the state, which is actually the subject of conflict: our judgements, perceptions and beliefs about the state or the state itself?

In interpretive terms, all these show that the state and the perceptions, judgements and beliefs we have ended up forming about the state are not static. And, even if our perceptions and judgements about the state are not static, it appears clear to me that, perhaps, a particular form or appearance/quality about the state may have influenced the contents of our perceptions about the state. Even though it is often contended that the nature and character of the *polis*, as conceived, in Aristotelian terms, do not exactly picture the nature of the modern state, it is still nevertheless a truism that the picture of idealism cast around the divergent theories of the state in general beggars the belief that the state is a dynamic construct. This dynamism is concocted within the understanding of the different realities encoded in each epoch or which the age in question seems to embody.

Granted all these postulates, this paper argues that the dynamic and changing status of the modern state, viewed from the perspectives of the etymology, history and dialectical features of the state, is negative rather than positive. The paper contends that, theoretically, the picture of consent and the contractual perspectives that classical theorists alluded to in explaining the emergence of the state is fast losing its normative appeal thus giving way to the idea that the modern state is a theatre or stage of conflict and one of lingering irreconcilable contradictions between and among competing and often antagonistic groups.

My idea of conflict is not completely new but it builds on the idea advanced by many conflict theorists over the years that conflict is not necessarily physical nor violent but can transcend the mutually comforting and commonsensical ways in which it has been opinionated in the literature.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, I seem to share the views of Johan Galtung (1998) on what constitute the necessary condition for the formation and existence of a conflict situation. It does not however follow that Galtung’s conception of conflict

<sup>1</sup> For examples of definitions of conflict, see Edward Murray (1963), Nicholson (1971), Coser (1956). Murray tags a conflict situation as a motivation towards two or more mutually exclusive activities; Nicholson says conflict occur where there is interaction between at least two individuals or groups whose ultimate objectives differ while Coser describes it as struggles over values and the intention to eliminate rivals over such values.

is unassailable, invincible and the most acceptable form of conception available. As a matter of fact, one could easily contend that the epistemological basis of Galtung's idea of conflict is an escapist one. But the beauty of the conception and which makes it readily adaptable is that, for Galtung (1998, 70), "deep inside every conflict lies a contradiction, something standing in the way of something." The definition does not, however, conclude that a contradiction is necessarily evil or destructive but my own estimation is that, if this conception is applied, strictly, in the interpretation of the normative status and the general characteristic of the modern state, a contradiction may be considered negative. This means that following the historical trajectory of the state, the existence of a contradiction in its conceptual understanding represents a negative outlook.

But, while it is true that the contractual models in classical philosophy were only models suggesting solutions to possible conflicts, already existing or that might arise among individuals or groups, and that, these classical theories did not imply a conflict free-zone, the idea of the formation of a state was underscored in those theories but, essentially, that the state that was conjured in these theories, not the great state empires in existence then, either in the West or Eastern part of the world, were construed in a sense as emanating principally because individuals and groups who found themselves in the state of nature<sup>2</sup> had to enter into a contract<sup>3</sup> between themselves, that is, between subjects and subjects, not subjects and sovereign, which means that, according to Alan Ebenstein (2002, 165), the state is a very crucial institution in ensuring that the subjects, who are party to the contract,

<sup>2</sup> The nature of the 'state of nature' in classical philosophical treatise, even though hypothetical and lacking factual reality, was not even conceived in the same ways by those who argued out and defended its significance for an emerging state theory. For example, while Hobbes contended that the state of nature was chaotic, with human life nasty, poor, brutish, short and solitary, Locke, the defender and astute articulator of what is called liberal individualism, never saw it as chaotic but as a golden era. The same, perhaps, could be said of Jean Jacques Rousseau, the French philosopher, who contended that man was born free but is in chains everywhere. So, the state of nature should not be held as representing, for all times and seasons, the same in terms of quality, limits and consequences. Gauba (2003) argued that Hobbes construction of the state of nature was borne out of his experience of the English Civil War of 1642 and sought to justify the doctrine of state absolutism as an essential condition for social solidarity. It follows that Hobbes was picturing a particular type of state theory through his postulation of the doctrine of absolutism while Locke's construct was informed by the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In both a contract and/or consent theory was emphasized even though what the contract or consent created for both were different. Important in both of course was the picture or theory of state those scholars had in mind. The idea of the state as subject to consent or contract was hinted at.

<sup>3</sup> Steve Buckler (2010) gives a modern interpretation of the contents and details of the contract from the perspective of liberalism as consisting of the following: mutual terms of agreement establishing a state that would enforce common rules to ensure peaceful coexistence meaning prevent, control, and manage real and imagined conflicts aside from protecting liberties and rights. Normatively, the state has a moral assignment towards citizens and very central to this normative assignment is perceptions about conflict.

maintain a conflict-free atmosphere to the satisfaction of the subjects. This normative image and picture of the state, viewed within the context of the modern state, is changing. It is of course true that many factors could account for the observed changes such as changes in the existing political order, the global emergence of new values, ideals and/or changes in the nature and scope of human epistemology etc. It is the nature of the changes, with respect to the modern state, in the light of the controversial concept of citizenship that attracts my attention.

#### **Divergent Opinions on the State: The Significance of Controversies**

Taylor (1983) contended aptly that there never was an age as theory-drenched as the modern age. From the domain of empirical science to the realm of pure and abstract philosophy, it appears evidential that theories seem to be the harbinger of truth concerning modern realities. In most cases, it seems reality also conjures in itself elements of mysticism such that it takes only a theory toothily packaged to demonstrate and express the true essence of what reality itself is. Significantly, ideas about what exactly is meant by the state in modern terminology is perspicuously affected and infected by this theory-drenched culture in which we live.

But, then, according to Berki (1989, 12), everybody agrees that the state is a rather baffling phenomenon. While it is true that the state may, indeed, be a baffling phenomenon, it is quite an exaggeration on the part of Berki to assume that everyone agrees. The baffling nature of the state and the terms of its expression may not be open to everyone. Besides, it is not out of place to come across those who actually see nothing baffling about the state and its complex institutional networks. Nevertheless, the baffling nature of the state pictured in Berki's opinion could actually have been influenced by the well-known remarks of Michel Foucault who contended that the state is ensconced in mythicised abstraction. In the words of Foucault (1991, 103), "but the state, no more probably than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor to speak frankly, this importance: may be after all the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicised abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think."

If we are to assign any sense of meaning to Foucault's conclusion on the state, I am inclined to believe that Foucault was being too overzealous concerning his remarks about the state especially in his preference for the term 'government' above the idea of the state. To designate the state as having a history yet denouncing its importance as ensconced in myth and abstraction is to provide an inconsistent analysis of the state. As Timothy Mitchell (2006, 179) contended, Foucault's analysis could not account for how the appearance of the state arose in the first place and what accounts for the reality of the composition that Foucault talked about in relation to the state. Indeed, one can claim that Foucault did attribute a history to the state, talked about that history and yet in his critique did not denounce, in particular, that history.

The meaning is that the state carries the aura of a non-existent entity. To ground the state in a non-abstract manner may exactly be what compelled G. D. H. Cole (1926) to suggest that rather than talk about the state, it is better to replace the state-concept with that of government-concept. In this case, it is believed by Cole that the actualities of the state

and what is meant when the term is raised for intellectual discussion would be obvious and thus not be riddled with uncertainties. The state is the governmental machine so concluded Cole (1926, 86). The philosopher, Harold Laski, also, in a sense, seem to have shared Cole's sympathy. For Laski (1919, 30), "state action is, in actual fact, action by the government."

The views of Cole and Laski are, however, denounced by Andrew Heywood who sees no anomaly in maintaining an apt and appropriate distinction between state and government despite the fact that the relationship between both terms remains shrouded in complexity. For Heywood, there is no reason why scholars cannot maintain a sense of distinction between state and government inasmuch as it is true that both terms are not and never synonymous. The absence of synonymity, for Heywood (2004, 77), is clear: state is an inclusive association while government is exclusive; the state is continuing while government is temporary; the state is inconceivable without a government while government is conceivable in the absence of a state.

Furthermore, Heywood contends that the state represents and reflects the permanent interests of society while government stands for the ideological preferences of the political figures in control of the state powers as at that moment. In short, Heywood (2004, 78) concludes that "the distinction between state and government is not, however, simply an academic refinement; it goes to the very heart of constitutional rule. Government power can only be held in check when government of the day is prevented from encroaching upon the absolute and unlimited authority of the state. This is particularly important given the conflicting interests which the state and the government represent."

The controversies surrounding the state are breathtaking and within the context of such a theoretical confusion one should not expect to have a sense of finesse when it comes to the definition of the state. Who can vouchsafe a definition of a matter so momentous and an issue that is of lingering interests yet encoded in what one may proudly call the ambiguity of intellectual undecidability.<sup>4</sup> No wonder, then, that Dyson (1980) constates that the state is a contested concept and, therefore, involves problems of meaning and application. Where there is the absence of enough empirical evidence to reiterate any particular definition, what most scholars often resort to is the attempt to isolate theories that could help in actualising the grounds for a solid discussion of the state.

To this end, the development of the theories of the state is, in terms of anticipation, a very significant one. This development not only projects a sense of dynamism around the idea of the state but also pictures, in the relevant sense, the changing status of the notion of

<sup>4</sup> This undecidability, in my view, is essentially theoretical, philosophical and encoded in abstraction without, most of the time, tangible, untestable reflections in reality judging, solely, from the nature and limits of definitions of the state in the literature: feminists, for instance, according to Randall (2010) see the state as the site and instrument of patriarchy. Michael Bakunin (1973), speaking from the mindset of anarchism, defines the state as the most flagrant, the most cynical and the most complete negation of humanity.

the state. Like Christopher Pierson (2004, 1) would readily claim the modern interest in the subject matter of the state seems to coincide with a period when the intellectual and academic faith in the idea of the state is declining, forcing us, as it were, to conclude that our age is that of the twilight of the state.<sup>5</sup> Very significant, however, is the fact that this trajectory of the state shows that the science of the state is a very comprehensive one. Even though this science is a laudable one, it, however, remains ensconced in the human science.<sup>6</sup>

There are several possible meanings to this observation: one, that the changing nature of the character of the state is an attribute of humans in their diversity; in other words, that pluralism, difference and heterogeneity are crucial aspects of our modern world and of the nature of humans; that no theory can be said to be comprehensive and detailed if it fails to accommodate this essential realities of our present world; two, that we cannot construct the theory of the state outside a consideration of the theory on, about, concerning and revolving around human nature.<sup>7</sup> G. Duncan (1983) once said that "at the centre of political theory lies the effort to establish a relationship between human nature, however that is conceived, and the state". The third possibility, and very important, is the fact that the comprehensive nature of the theories of the state reveals the absence of satisfaction with the nature of preceding thoughts. This explains the view that state theories are the outcome of philosophical speculations an indication that the modern world is still in dire need of the philosophical temperament. The fourth possibility, of course, consist in the view that we now live in the age of ideological professions, profligacy and possibilities which means that our understanding of the state often has an ideological flavour undergirding its expression and conclusions. Basically, it is these diverse ideologies that inform the need for theorisation and theory constructions. So, then, those who canvass the view that the age of ideology has come to an end will not only be disappointed by considering the enormous weight the state seems to shoulder but by considering the fact whether just one theory is enough to explain the complexity that surrounds the idea of the state even in the twenty first century.

<sup>5</sup> The decline, in my view, is not out of disregard for the importance of the state but because the state itself, if it really exists, has disregarded its importance. In other words, the understanding that the state is controversial and yet proving indispensable, as argued by Ralph Miliband (1973), is one of the reasons in my view why the decline is so pertinent and evident.

<sup>6</sup> Andrew Heywood (2004) has observed pertinently that a major and lasting attribute of all theories within the sphere of the human science, that is, human social nature, is that they are all concocted from a normative perspective so long as those theories are not testable.

<sup>7</sup> According to some scholars, Stevenson (1974), for instance, the question 'what is man?' lies essentially at the root of all philosophical theories. In this sense, one may claim that the philosophical theories of the state, in their deepest controversies, are clear attempts to show that there are no agreed theories on what human nature is.

### The State and Citizenship

The very fact that there are conflicting ideologies in our days is enough evidence of the continuing possibility of conflicting theories of the state. For example, liberalism, Marxism, Socialism, Fascism, Anarchism, theories about Nationalism and Feminism are examples of ideologies today with important implications on what the state is and what it should look like.<sup>8</sup> The historical development of these ideologies and their philosophical inputs into how the world should be creates enough intellectual impetus to consider the changing status and character of the modern state. The question is what is the nature of the changing status of the modern state and to what can we attribute the change? Apart from the evidence associated with the movement from one state theory to another theory, historically, my emphasis is on the changing status of the modern state vis-à-vis the controversial concept of citizenship.

A characterisation of the changing nature of the modern state is obviously incomplete without a consideration of the corresponding influence the state bears on citizenship. While the previous section hinted at the view that the state, historically and conceptually, has been construed using the language of change, the idea of citizenship with which this nexus and the changing character of the state is demonstrated needs to be familiarly and fashionably conceptualised. Such conceptualisation in itself further proves that the emerging picture of citizenship, in the modern world, corroborates the thesis that the state's original mooring as an hypothetical entity concocted, using the idea of consent or a moral image and posture, may no longer be attributed to it. Indeed, it is a proposition too plain to contest that the modern state itself has been at the threshold and background of conflicts in modern societies.

Curiously, in every modern state, there is always a one-to-one correlation between the state and citizenship. Citizenship makes sense within the confines of the state. In other words, the hallmark of modern states is citizenship. Drawing fresh insights from phenomenology, modern replication of state-citizen relationship is reminiscent of Brentano's acclaimed one-to-one identity between the subject and the object i.e. the cogito always produces a cogitatum. Thus, one can say that the state is the cogito whereas the citizen is the consciousness that the state carry or embody i.e. the cogitatum. This is what is generally called the statist tradition in the conceptualisation of citizenship. According to this tradition (Janoski 1998, 12), it is meaningless conceiving the idea of citizenship without a corresponding construction of the state. Citizenship exists only within the purview of the state. But then what is the meaning of citizenship?

<sup>8</sup> Even though most feminist has reiterated the need to debunk the significance of the state to political analysis, yet, today, feminists have not only sought to expand the scope of what the political is but equally gone ahead to construct feminist idea of the state with the use of several catchy phrases such as the 'the gendered state' or 'gendering the state', or Connell's (1990) concept of 'gender regime' or Chappell's (2006) notion of the 'new institutionalism' which is also seen as enveloping the idea of a gendered logic of appropriateness within institutions.

Perspicaciously, according to Ralf Dahrendorf (1974, 673), "there is no more dynamic social figure in modern history than the Citizen." In his opinion, Bryan Turner (1990, 194) contended that "the problem of citizenship has re-emerged as an issue which is central, not only to practical political questions concerning access to health care systems, education institutions, and the welfare state, but also to traditional theoretical debates in sociology over the conditions of social integrations and social solidarity." Modern commentators on the idea of citizenship often are found expressing a normative defense for the state based on the sanctity of its vitality (citizenship) to the existence of democratic culture.

It is only now, perhaps, due to a whole lot of factors that the idea of citizenship seems to be enjoying an intestinal prominence within the context of critical concepts and debates in socio-political philosophy and political theory. Concepts dreaded within socio-political philosophy are now seen to have an internal connection and significance in relation to citizenship. Social justice, for instance, or justice for short, is meaningless except when it is brought home to bear in relation to human society. And where their conceptual significance is reiterated in intellectual discourses, it would appear as if their prominence is actually subsumed under the rubrics and elemental rudiments of citizenship. The same can be said of equality, liberty, civil society, civil disobedience and even democratic discussions. The important fact is that all these revered concepts in political theory are intertwined, one way or the other, with the idea of citizenship. In other words, it follows that modern intellectual exchanges are empty and represents mere façade when the idea of citizenship is omitted. It is thus indubitable that we live in the age of citizenship.

A little before this time, citizenship discourses and ideas around it seem to carry a pestilential air among political thinkers. As a matter of fact, Van Gusteren (1978, 9), opined strongly that "citizenship has gone out of fashion among political thinkers." However, since the 1990's, possibly due to the increasing wave of democratization all over the world, especially in Africa, and the reverberating influences and impacts of globalization, citizenship, according to Derek Heater (1990, 293), has become the 'buzz word' among political thinkers. This same view was shared by Vogel and Moran (1991, x).

The importance of citizenship seems to straddle between the fact that it is on one hand ensconced and entrenched in a sweeping sense of normativity and, on the other hand, it is seen as the basis and source of the legitimacy of certain political actions in a given political society. Nevertheless, it is still a truism that we live in the age of 'the citizen.' The popularity of the citizen discourse has been attributed to the resurgence in minority rights and some other conditions of modern societies. This is the view of Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (2000, 5-6). In the words of these authors,

There are a number of reasons for this growing interest in citizenship throughout the 1990s. One reason is related to the rise of minority rights. Debates over multiculturalism have often been fractious, and have put a considerable strain on the norms of civility and good citizenship...but there are several other recent political events and trends throughout the world that point to the importance of citizenship practices. These include increased voter apathy and long-term welfare

dependency in the United States, the erosion of the welfare state, and the failure of environmental policies that rely on voluntary citizen co-operation.

While it is true that philosophical ideas are generated conceptually or in terms of abstraction, it will still not be true to contend that those ideas belong to the realm of abstraction alone. Philosophical thinking is undoubtedly influenced by and the tenor of their conceptual tenacity is also critically derived and derivable from experience and practical affairs of human societies. This is because philosophers are, themselves, ensconced and situated in specific societies. Citizenship is thus and has always been of philosophical interests. Greek philosophy is replete with fantastic instances of philosophical thoughts on citizenship. Aristotle reflected on citizenship just as much as Plato did. Going by Greek philosophical discussion on citizenship, it behooves one to constate that the concept is suggestive of a democratic ideal.

Even though T. H. Marshall (1950, 28-29) is often credited with the provision of a seminal approach to the idea of citizenship, it is exactly clear that his analysis does not describe nor conceptualize citizenship as a democratic ideal. The greatest offer of Marshall's thesis is the internal connection that citizenship shares with rights, on one hand, and the systematic institutionalization of a scheme of welfare through those rights, on the other. Apart from this, Marshall, again, did not prove that citizenship was going to generate any form of conflict in states that subscribe to the idea of citizenship as an institution of the state. Yet, citizenship today is not only a prominent feature of state construction; it is equally a source of perennial trouble and crisis for modern states especially those that are multicultural and those in which vestiges of external control of internal policies are still discernible. As a matter of fact, the "Gentleman Theory of Citizenship" that Marshall passionately worked for and defended would, definitely, be against the claims and requirements that modern citizenship is making on modern states.

The only conceptual platitude for conflicts that Marshall's analysis created room for was the view that citizenship and capitalism are bound to be in perpetual war with each other. Besides, Marshall did not invent the study of citizenship in relation to or in the light of the state. While it is true that Marshall was actually concerned with welfarism and social classes, the critical role of the state was not adequately spelt out in Marshall's analysis. It was a theory steeped in much passion for the actualization of rights. No wonder Kathryn Dean (2003, ix) contended that modern citizenship has overwhelmingly been a matter of rights; rights to life, liberty and happiness; right to privacy and property. Following the Marshallian tradition in England, that is, the right centric tradition, a British Government White paper (1991) defined citizenship as people's rights to be informed and choose for themselves. No doubt, the influence of Marshall is notable here but Marshall's conception of rights as the core and essence of citizenship neglected a seasoned analysis of the implications of those rights for state condition especially those in Third World countries or aspiring democracies.

According to Peter Ekeh (1975), the political problems of the age as well as the historical context of politics determine to a large extent the aspects and issues of citizenship that are

sorted out for emphasis in a given society. Ekeh's comments on the sociological conditions of citizenship are insightful and illuminating. States', for instance, that are still struggling with the effects of colonialism are likely to have problems with the full demands and requirements of the institution of citizenship. Again, if we take Ekeh seriously, we are bound to agree that even states that have problems of legitimacy are also, historically and contemporaneously, going to have problems in the institutionalization of citizenship. Postcolonial states, for example, are drawn in a lingering struggle between the internal conditions of their respective societies and the character of stability which are manifesting in such societies. Questions concerning political legitimacy, allocation of resources, the nature of political accountability, transparency and probity all seems to be tied around the bounds and boundary of citizenship. As a matter of fact, in every modern state, citizenship seems to be the bedrock on which political programs and policies are based.

In most advanced countries, it is correct to say that many of the hurdles that confront citizenship seem to have been transcended, at least, to a minimum. It is in this sense that Peter Ekeh's pointed remark above seem to derive and attract their inherent truth.<sup>9</sup> Perspicaciously, though citizenship and its historical contour and anatomy seems to be different in both western and non-western societies, it appears that they have become subject matters of conflicts although we may have to agree that what constitute the contents of conflicts would definitely be different from each other. The nature of conflicts that underlie both western and non-western conception and attitude to citizenship in modern states can be compared to the differences development scholars and economists point out between the concept of "economic development" and the concept of "economic growth".<sup>10</sup>

To speak in logical terms, talk of a state implies the existence of citizenship. In other words, states constitute the necessary condition for the existence of citizenship rights. It is therefore an aberration to define citizenship in terms of the phenomenon of ethnicity. This makes the state, for instance, an unquestionably influential spatial and historical category in the analysis of the political and democratic process in the world especially in Third World States. Even in distant Europe, the era of the state and its relative significance in the understanding of the political process is not yet over. Even the idea of European

<sup>9</sup> In a country like Nigeria, aspects of the political problems and the historical contexts, such as the long era of militarization, the northern principle of primacy, the ethnic configuration of political parties, the religious diversities imbued into the history of Nigeria, and the general passivism and lack of correct political education, among others, seem to provide the historical contour that has shaped the nature, texture and conditions of citizenship generally. Those conditions of citizenship place the state in situations of instability.

<sup>10</sup> A general synthesis of the difference between the concepts of "development" and "growth" and with serious implications on the different attitude to citizenship concern in both western and non-western societies is that development is the concern of non-western countries while growth is the concern of western countries. The former is fundamental while the latter is incremental. Citizenship conflict in non-western countries is directed at and influenced by concerns with development while citizenship concerns in the west is directed at and influenced by concerns with growth.

citizenship, some have argued, is meaningless unless and until a European state is formed. The same goes for the idea of global citizenship. Such constructs and their conceptual designations remain slippery concepts without the establishment of a global state. We have to agree with Crawford Young (1993, 29) that the state is not an inert abstraction; it is above all a historical actor, a collective agent of macro political process.

Given the analysis above, many reasons account for the claim that, viewed from the perspective of citizenship, the nature of the state is changing from what we historically know it to be, that is, as an entity that is neutral, created on account of agreement between consenting individuals to one that is non-neutral, partisan and a complex domain and theatre of conflicts. Many of the classical philosophers<sup>11</sup> had viewed the emergence of the state to consist in the evolution of a contract and consent between citizens themselves, on one hand and, on the other hand, the sovereign who is configured to represent the state. While this contention is actually not wrong, a great metamorphosis, via the problem of citizenship, nevertheless, is a daily confront on the nature of the state.

In the first instance, the assertion above makes sense if we understand that not only is it that the state has an historical context but, also, that the type of historicity built around the state also matters. The modern state is a product of many factors but a major and very important qualifying characteristic of the modern state, especially in the Third World, is that it is a nations-state, not a nation-state. This is very important in underscoring the view that the characteristic of the modern state is one riddled with conflict rather than a product of consent or contract. At best, one can contend that the inability of the modern state to mitigate and manage the contents of the assumed contract with and/or consent of the citizen, if there were any at all *ab initio*, has turned the nature of the modern state to a conflict-ridden one.

The meaning of the term “nations-state” is very significant. Kwame Gyekye (1997) and Idowu (2008, 240-250) have provided very illuminating accounts of the apt distinction between nations-states and nation-state and how that distinction translates into an effective understanding of the dilemmatic situation that the modern state seem to be experiencing. But then, the account of Luc van de Goor *et al.* (1996) on the connection between conflict and development equally provides a detailed attempt at understanding the crisis of the state.

In their analysis, conflicts can be seen in four main types: political, cultural, economic and military. These all are striking characteristics of the twentieth century which means that the twentieth century is the bloodiest period in all of human history (1996, xv-xviii). This is, in a sense, true: two World Wars were fought and staged during the last century. However, what is worrisome about this pattern of conflict, according to their analysis, is that: one, the conflicts in question are prevalently situated within the context of the Third

<sup>11</sup> The popular philosophical coinage underscoring this position is what Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau in their very different ways and manner tagged the Social Contract Theory.

World and the region of developing countries.<sup>12</sup> But the important assertion, according to their study, which is the second pattern of the nature of conflict, is that these conflicts are internally generated than externally induced; they are local creations rather than being global in context and consequences.

The meaning is that those conflicts are, integrally and fundamentally, crisis of the state in question.<sup>13</sup> Concerning this latter proposition and position, many factors are responsible: one, the absence of democratisation;<sup>14</sup> two, the problems associated with development or the willingness to initiate or allow the full process of development;<sup>15</sup> three, internal rumblings that have the appearance of secession, self-determination and, more recently, fundamentalism;<sup>16</sup> four, citizenship discontent with the agenda of such states especially

<sup>12</sup> According to Kalevi Holsti (1991, 274-278), between 1945 and 1989, about 58 wars and major armed conflicts occurred but only two occurred outside the context of the Third World countries. And, what is more, in his estimation they are in one way or the other connected with liberation from colonial rule, state creation and regime legitimacy. The estimation of wars and the factors could be described as conservative given that there are many other events of a conflict situation that occurred in other insignificant areas of the world which are not accounted for in Kalevi's numeric tabulation. The conservatism is, again, obvious given the view that many of the wars that occurred are not tied essentially to the factors adumbrated by Kalevi. Nevertheless, the import of the study is educative and raises our epistemological insight on the nature of the modern state.

<sup>13</sup> Many Scholars are agreed on this proposition and position. According to Kalevi (1992, 38), this lends credence to the view that conflicts in Third World countries are nothing but the “ubiquitous corollary of the birth, formation, and fracturing of ‘Third World’ States”.

<sup>14</sup> According to Larry Diamond (1990, 48-49), while it is true that the 1990s can be declared as the decade of the return to full democratization all over the world, this impulse and excitement is short-lived by the fact that democracy is very difficult to maintain. This difficulty, called one of the paradoxes of democracy, explains the challenge of full democratization within the context of the modern state. According to Diamond, one paradox which has crippled the modern democratic (constitutional) state is what he calls the paradox between consent on one hand and effectiveness of states on the other. According to Diamond, “democracy will not be valued by the people unless it deals effectively with social and economic problems and achieves a modicum of order and justice.”

<sup>15</sup> H. W. Houweling (1996, 143) provided a very relevant conceptualization of the development necessary to mitigate the occurrence of crisis and conflict within the state from the perspective of citizenship. Such a developmental agenda is one where the state is non-confiscatory, impersonal and bureaucratic and where rights of citizenship are freely exercised. This is proper development. Unfortunately, this idea of development is lacking inasmuch as citizenship is still denigrated by the state.

<sup>16</sup> Examples from Algeria, Sri Lanka, India and Malaysia establish the fundamental challenges posed by Islamic and religious fundamentalism to the state in these countries. Yet, it is not this rising political phenomenon alone that that threatens the state. Equally troubling is the ethnic and racial imbalance which unequivocally defines present modern societies.

where such states are regarded or seen as examples of failed states<sup>17</sup> or, in the language of Robert Jackson (1990), quasi-states.

One possible interpretation of this scenario is that the nature of the modern state as a nation-state is laden with serious implications and the meaning it conjures is that the state is changing from an entity concocted through contract or consent to that of conflict. As a nation-state, the modern state is bound to have within its settings crisis that is foundationally and fundamentally disintegrating. It all arises from the actual meaning of the term nation-state. This cannot be done outside the frame of the understanding and meaning of nation-state. A nation-state, according to Tilly (1990, 3) is one whose peoples share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity. In such an arrangement, Ayooob (1996, 70) contends that nationalism is a necessary condition or element. In other words, shared nationalistic feelings are the basis for the formation of a nation-state. It means in the absence of such a condition, the idea of a nation-state relapses into a mirage, or less euphemistically, mere wishful thinking.

Nevertheless, it depends on how nationalism is construed. In the words of E. U. Essien-Udom (1962, 6), nationalism, as a concept, may be thought of as the belief of a group that it possesses, or ought to possess a country; that it shares, or ought to share, a common heritage of language, culture, and religion; and that its heritage, way of life, and ethnic identity are distinct from those of other group. Ali Mazrui (2004) constate that nationalism is not subject nor limited to a single definition inasmuch as it attracts its very meaning based on who is doing the definition or the interpretation. According to Mazrui (2004, 472), “nationalism is both an ideology with specific constituent ideas and a set of sentiments, loyalties, and emotional predispositions”. In the words of Heywood (2007, 143), it is “the belief that the nation is the central principle of political organization” meaning that, one, humankind is naturally divided into distinct nations and that, the nation is the most appropriate and perhaps only legitimate unit of political life.

The idea is that nationalism is not objective attitudinal predispositions since it is tied more to sentiments, loyalties and emotions which can shift and are, by nature, essentially fleeting. The so-called objective basis of nationalistic feelings is a group feeling which can be subjected to changing conditions. This, however, does not detract from the fact that what sustains the idea of a nation-state is the strong belief in the sameness of identity. Yet, modern anthropological studies have revealed the fact that identity is not static, and that, identity of a person can be multiple or defined using multiple indices.<sup>18</sup> The implication is

<sup>17</sup> Failed states have been defined poetically by Ayooob (1996, 81) to mean the combination of a juridically sovereign but empirically non-functioning central authority in a state. A failed state necessarily breeds the high incidence of ethnic nationalism which is of course rooted in the absence of true citizenship. A situation where ethnic nationalism is the order of the day shows that conflict is not just the resort but the rule of the game. It is in this sense that Jack Snyder (1993, 12) classifies ethnic nationalism as a default option.

<sup>18</sup> Kwame Appiah (2004), for instance, wrote that limiting the configuration of identity of an individual to one set of factors such as race, gender, religion, and culture is to create ways in and through which the identity of such individuals is eventually restricted.

that the possibility of identity being shared is not exactly remote. While this is not exactly a minus for nationalism and the idea of nation-state, which is the opposite of the nature of the state in Third World countries, Ernest Gellner (1983, 1) opined that the nationalism which works for a nation-state is one where the political and the national unit of that society is congruent with each other.

But this is not the nature of the modern state. If this were, then, the aura of modernity around the state in developing and under developing regions of the world would appear rather calm and categorically co-habiting. The irony is that modern states are now becoming or were initially nation-state with few exceptions in some parts of the western world. The meaning is that the modern states of Europe, according to Luc van de Goor *et al.* (1996, 6-7) which were states before they became nations, are now becoming enmeshed in struggles that are nationalistic in nature and that are essentially prompted and promoted by secessionist desires, self-determination struggles and dissatisfaction with the centralizing authority.

Upon critical acceptance this statement would mean that, in European experiences, what emerged eventually were not nations that became states other wise that would make them nation-states as we have in most Third World countries. What emerged were nation-states because the states in question had existed before the idea of nationhood evolved and which gained ground overtime. In other words, Western model of state making was remarkably different from those that emerged, after colonialism, in the Third World countries. However, even though colonialism contributed to the emergence of nation-states in Third World countries, the multicultural element, due to globalization, migration and other globally construed phenomena of incorporation are turning states even in Europe to nation-state.<sup>19</sup>

Interestingly, the tendency in modern societies, in Europe and Third World countries, towards what Will Kymlicka (1995, 10) calls cultural imperialism, where a very large cultural group dominates and preside over affairs of other groups, such as minority groups, is crippling the nature of the modern state and it is equally having corrosive effects on the idea of citizenship. The possibility, actual and factual, of such domination by the predominant cultural group is what is referred to as cultural imperialism. This brand of imperialism suggests the absence of the recognition of difference, the refusal to accommodate the cultural identities of minority groups, and the distribution of resources in

<sup>19</sup> It is estimated that by 2050 the Latino or Hispanic community in the United States of America will form a quarter of the population of that country more than any other cultural and linguistic group. See Heywood (2007, 312, 330) According to Grillo (1989), the illusion that countries such as Britain, United States of America and France are “melting pot” is losing its long time appeal. All these only show that the liberal state can no longer serve as the representative of general interests considering the rise in the multiethnic phenomenon even in the western world. Alemika (2003, 11) attributes this to the fact that the liberal state only enforces individual rights and interests rather than collective, group rights and interest thereby endangering the possibility and promotion of equality between and among these diverse groups.



### Citizenship, Deprivation and the Modern State

defiance of the cultural equation and logic of the respective polytechnic and multicultural blend of that society by the dominant cultures (always in control of political and economic powers of that state). The push and pull of this cultural imbalance is what escalates into political misunderstanding and struggle for ascendancy between the rivals. This struggle sometimes is an attempt to defend citizenship sentiments which the cultural groups believe they all share. At other times, the struggle consists in the bid to maintain and enforce the sense of cultural distinction, especially on the part of the minority groups, which they regard as non-negotiable.

The second argument which shows that the modern state, as an institution, is conflictual rather than contractual draws enormous weight from the way the state's economic system is being operated. This removes the understanding of the state away from a contractual one to that of conflict, and, from a sociological concept to one that is economically determined and enmeshed in severe economic trappings. The economic image that the modern state bears betrays essentially its several attempts at retaining its humble beginning as a socio-political entity. The economic image of the modern state is illustrated by its partnership with the capitalist system. The relationship between the state and citizenship has been severally viewed and contested through its very deep alliance with capitalism.

Historically, Marshall's work on citizenship and social class represents a vivid and illustrative analysis of the unequal yoke between citizenship and capitalism. According to Marshall, citizenship and capitalism are bound to be in perpetual enmity with each other. This is because, according to Marshall (1949, 29), citizenship promotes and emphasises equality and rejects exclusion; capitalism, on the other hand, endorses a system of inequality and defends exclusion. It is therefore obvious that both institutions and systems are conceptually, contextually and in terms of values, ideals and beliefs at odds with each other. Yet, it appears that capitalism is the major supplier of the blocks on which the economic ambience/foundation of the modern state is built.<sup>20</sup> Possibly, it could be that this is the reason why John Hoffman (2004, 17) reiterated that the state cannot uphold principles of universalism and emancipation in relation to citizenship. This is based on the view that the state is too monopolistic not only in the use of violence to promote the "common good", a task that Hoffman sees the state as incapable of achieving, but also in the fact that it is an exclusionary institution; it includes some and excludes others within the same setting without appealing to any modicum of rationality.

The word "monopoly" as used by Hoffman is economically significant: one of the ways the modern state exercises monopoly over its citizens and excludes them has to do with

<sup>20</sup> See Klaus Jurgen Gantzel and Jens Siegelberg (1998). Based on insights from these two scholars, the aftermath of the Second World War became associated with the imposition of capitalism in the world generally. Another critical dimension to this observation is that while democracy was being enthroned everywhere in the globe, especially in the 1990s, socialism was being dethroned especially in the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc. The twist of fate is that democracy and capitalism, in these times, became integrally connected such that the democratic state today is almost synonymous with the imposition and onslaught of capitalism.

the way the economy operates, with the way resources are allocated, distributed and how collective benefits are shared. All these, it is argued, stems from the fact that the state system, especially the liberal type in most western systems, endorses some forms of deprivation or the other. In such a system of deprivation, what holds is the fact that the state system encourages deprivation. To be deprived is to be denied the opportunities to enjoy the standard of living that is befitting that of citizens. John Scott (1994) corroborates this view when he posited that the poor are those who are deprived of the resources that would allow them to participate to the full as a citizen of their society.

These definitions are meaningful for analysis in the light of the concept of citizenship. Since the state system is structured after this pattern, what results is the outbreak of conflicts between aggrieved citizens against the state system. As a matter of fact, such wars and conflicts, according to Dietrich Jung *et al.* (1996, 56) have to be seen as conditions of the emergence and advancement of capitalism. Furthermore, it is clear that such state with such capitalistic bent are generally unable to manage and mitigate the social conflicts that arises as a result of the infusion of the principles of and the transition to capitalism. Such an economic legacy is one of the reasons why state legitimacy is normally questioned.

But the implication of this analysis for the nature of the state as a theatre of conflict rather than consent is carried to interesting heights in the thoughts of T. M. Marshall. According to Marshall, where deprivation is encouraged by the state system or the economic system it adopts, it affects the public status of the citizen. In a capitalist system, for instance, according to Marshall, the system is run in such a way that it not only promotes class inequalities but gross manifestation of relative deprivation. With relative deprivation, it follows that those who are referred to as citizens are constrained by the economic system that is in vogue.

At another level, citizens are constrained by what Samuel Britten (1977) calls the economic consequences of democracy where politicians not only outbid themselves by promises they make during campaigns for vote but are restricted in the choice of what they do to citizens either by concentrating on only those who vote for them or, on account of corruption. This confirms what Larry Diamond (1990, 48-60) had already described as the three paradoxes of democracy. One of the paradoxes is that democracy in itself, surprisingly, and quite contrary to normal expectations, generate a sense of conflict where it is the case that dividends of democracy are not delivered and where citizens perceive that rulers are either not faithful in their promises or promote a sectarian agenda with regards to the distribution of goods and services.

In most cases, evidentially, one of the economic consequences of democracy is the promotion of class politics and, by implication, class conflict or, to dissuade our minds away from thinking Marxistially, conflicts between, among and by elites in society.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> A number of scholars (Burnham 1941; Wright-Mills 1956; Bottomore 1993; Tom Young 2003) have given enough intellectual attention on the cogitative and cerebral significance of the elite factor and the concept of elitism in appraising the nature of the state and the potential impact that concept bears in the understanding of conflict with regard to the state. From

What is unfortunate always is that the state often becomes partisan in the sense that it becomes absorbed in elite's interests and preferences and thus loses its neutrality. This is often exemplified in states in the Third World especially Asia and Africa where empirically instantiated is the fact that most leaders in these regions of the world have spent longer years in power than what obtains in western liberal democratic countries.<sup>22</sup> Such self-designated, personal rule is, most of the time, antagonistic to the principles of effective, transparent and credible change of leadership based on consent.

Essentially, such a phenomenon, rampant all over the world and throughout history, represents a denigration and clever truncation of the process that allows for the cultivation of true citizenship ideals and standards. It might have had its possibility engineered by the constitutive and totalistic nature of the state itself or a telling and compelling indicator of the kind of society in question, yet, it is undeniable that states where personal rule have been established, where, like Louis XIV, the leaders declared themselves as *the state*, have been thrown into moments, whether prolonged or short, of instability, strife, conflicts and chaos. In a sense, the decorum and values of governance are contradicted by such self-induced professions and utterances.<sup>23</sup> As Tom Young (2003, 2) constates in relation to the nature of African politics, "over time African societies, or elements of them, have resisted these tendencies causing both politics and states to fail."

As a matter of fact, where personal rule is established, it, in a way, constitutes a sense of disrespect and rejection of the values and potentials that are ingrained in the ethos and culture of that particular society. The breach of trust has often escalated into the outbreak

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these scholarly analyses, no doubt, elitism is a fundamental characterization of capitalism and represents the extensive possibilities that are associated with capitalism especially in its influence on the running contradictions that capitalism often displays.

<sup>22</sup> When Louis XIV declared, famously and triumphantly, "*L'etat c'est moi*" in France that he was the state, it was thought to be an aberration. Today, as we look at Asia, Latin American countries and, in Africa, with countries like Uganda, Egypt, Libya, Kenya, Cameroun, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi in the days of Kamuzu Banda, Tanzania, and Zaire under Mobutu, we have no choice but in saying that what Louis XIV declared in those days of imperial rule in France and some parts of Europe have received a revival in the world. The interesting fact is that these leaders represents certain elitists interests in society and have only succeeded in using state power to advance those elite's interests. Just recently, the opposition leader in Uganda, Dr. Kizza Besigye, was arrested on 21<sup>st</sup> April, 2011 over protest on the high cost of food and fuel prices. The interesting aspect is that both have been allies all along. Museveni's control over power is highly suspect considering the way and manner in which opposition leaders have been handled and treated. This is what Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (2003) tagged as "personal rule"

<sup>23</sup> Kamuzu Banda of Malawi was once noted as saying that "I don't care what the world calls me, a dictator or what, my job is to develop this country." Impliedly, Banda's belief is that of a notorious dictator who saw nothing essentially good or worthwhile in other citizens' access to the development of Malawi. The question is after many years of personal rule, how developed is Malawi?

of conflicts as it is clearly instantiated in what is now popularly known as the global Arab uprising in countries such as Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain etc. These conflicts have both political and economic implications on the character of the modern state especially where such states, though professes allegiance to socialism, but in practice, is essentially capitalistic in character.

It is in this sense that Marshal quite anticipated that essentially a capitalist system will always be in perpetual war with the ideals of citizenship. Where a state adopts the capitalistic principles and ideals, it is incumbent that such a state system is operated, no doubt, on the principle of political and economic inequality while citizenship itself is a programme of general equality. In this sense, capitalism entails a struggle and conflict with the ideals of citizenship. In other words, conflict characterises relationship in a capitalist order. This is because inequality is in conflict with equality. Attempts to realise the gains of citizenship which is an agenda of equality are often precipitants to conflict in such a state system.<sup>24</sup>

It appears that it is this essential struggle and antagonism that was anticipated earlier in Marx's political philosophy when he wrote that capitalism engenders inequality and alienation of citizens. In proper terms, the implication of Marx's thought for citizenship is what was demonstrated and fleshed out in Marshal's extensive treatment on relationship between citizenship and social classes. Marx and Marshall seem to have been agreed on this point: capitalism generates in a society a system of inequity and inequality. The result, for both scholars, is what is essentially captured as the perpetuity of conflicts. In this kind of socio-political ecology, the state is not an innocent institution but a very important aspect of this conflictual conundrum.

Kathryn Dean (2003) has attempted a thought-provoking analysis of the connection between citizenship and capitalism. Both cannot be coterminous a fact which suggest that the modern state, since it carries the aura of capitalism, has become an entity riddled with conflict rather than an institution based on the model of fair play, mutual consent, agreement, consensus and contract. Three reasons account for this conclusion or claim. One, citizenship is essentially a public-spirited idea; it is about the idea of participation which is meaningful only within the context of the public. Capitalism, on the other hand, thrives on the idea of the private. It is about the private realm where every part and involvement is sacred. How then can capitalism promote the essence and stay of citizenship when both are essentially concerned with different texture of political obligations?

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<sup>24</sup> The outbreak of conflicts in the Niger Delta of Nigeria has been argued to consist in the different and contradictory ways in which the public status of citizenship is defined in the Nigerian nations-state. Many scholars have written on the citizenship-conflict dimension of the problem in the Niger Delta in Nigeria and some other regions, such as Angola, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, where oil resource has been responsible for the escalation of crisis and conflicts. See, for examples, Ike Okonta (2008), Idowu William (2002).

Again, the central focus of capitalism is the market. What thickens the blood of capitalism revolves around how the market and its forces are made to run and operate. Without any iota of sacredness attached to the market, capitalism cannot exist talk less of having any sense of meaning. However, a very close look at citizenship shows that it is not at all about the market. Citizenship does not, in any way, derive its sacredness from an attachment to the market. Without due consideration to the market, it does not follow that that the essence of citizenship has been compromised for its essence does not lie there. How then can citizenship and capitalism be coterminous? Market forces in a capitalist system are, most of the time, not sympathetic to the core ideals and principles that citizenship, as an institution, stands for.

Thirdly, capital is the main driving force of capitalism while it is not for citizenship for although there is due consideration to capital which is what we may call economic empowerment but it does not follow that citizenship arise essentially from an obsessive tendency to acquire capital or be judged worthy of existence by it. Capital, while not insignificant, is not the very basis of citizenship. State endorsement of capitalism is one of the ways in which the modern state has dragged itself into conflict with the idea of citizenship, the aura of democracy around it notwithstanding. As a matter of fact, the appeal and allusion to democracy is a pretentious attempt on the part of the modern state to create an unbroken, unhindered atmosphere and freedom for capitalism to thrive without the restriction of popular culture.

One of these ways is elitism that was hinted at earlier on. It is no wonder that elitist theorists criticised liberal democratic theorists for the pretentious silence over the fact that, in most western democracies, especially in the United States of America, it is actually the phenomenon that C. Wright Mills (1956) calls “the military-industrial complex” that influences state policies contrary to the push and pull of the citizenry or the electorate. Judged from this perspective, it is no wonder that modern anarchists perceive the modern state as nothing more than an instrument of organised violence. Murray Bookchin (1982, 197) was even willing, along this line of thought, to see the state as representing a mindset whose global agenda is the realisation and institutionalisation of coercion. This is one of the reasons, perhaps, why he described the state as “an instilled mentality for ordering reality.”

Concerning the connection between the state, citizenship, capitalism and conflict, scholars are not agreed: van de Goor *et al.* (1996, 19) constate that the connection stems from the inability to take redistributive measures for citizens in situations where there is shortfalls in export revenues, Houweling (1996, 162) is of the view that the accounting factor is the absence of administrative means to regulate behaviour especially where pre-state institutions seek to offer survival strategies. On my part, the role that exploitation and corruption plays by the political class in the capitalists’ accumulation process cannot be overemphasised. This is where Robert Ted Gurr’s (1970) theory of relative deprivation as precipitants to conflict in the modern state becomes relevant. The discrepancy between citizens’ expectation and what they actually get creates the predisposition to conflict a situation where, in obvious terms, the state is always complicit.

### **Migration, National Citizenship, and the Modern State**

The impact of global migration on the nature of citizenship and the modern state appears phenomenal. The impact is complex and it does not appear clear to me that this section can attend to all the issues that are connected with the subject matter. Nevertheless, even if the treatment is likely to be perfunctory, the importance of the concepts to the changing character of the state is what necessitates the attention given to it here. To do justice to the issues will require a whole and complete paper outside the purview of the present endeavour.

The contention here is that the contour of global migration has had and continues to have a critical and perhaps a negative impact on the idea of national citizenship and the character of the modern state turning it, as it were, to a theatre of conflict and irreconcilable interests. A critical look at the effect of globalisation on citizenship shows, very glaringly, that the state is more of a theatre of conflict than one of consent. Migration pattern all over the world, for example, shows a dramatic change in the pattern of citizenship and consequently a change in the character of the modern state. But then, the question is: what exactly is the pattern of change that migration exposes the concept of citizenship to and what is the relevance of the state in this whole episode? This is a crucial question inasmuch as it helps us transcend the myopism that often characterises the treatment of the notion of citizenship in the light of migration.

The effect of migration on national citizenship, and, consequently, on the modern state cannot be effectively underscored if we neglect the connection it has with multiculturalism. Clearly, there has been a one-to-one effect between multiculturalism and migration. The increase in global migration since 1945 has paved way for the high incidence of cultural and ethnic diversity. It is historically true that after the Second World War, many European societies had to open their borders for neighbouring countries and most especially to former colonies in a bid to restore and rebuild the ruined economies. This is the economic dimension. Besides this, the incidence of conflicts all over the world especially in the Eastern bloc, for example, the collapse of the former USSR, Yugoslavia, political instability in some Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in Africa based on nationalistic struggles, ethnic relation breakdown and the clamour for ideological reforms have also increased the rate of migration all over the world. The number of refugees all over the world, on account of these wars and conflicts, are reasons why migration patterns have increased tremendously.

In fact, given this scenario, most scholars see explosion in migration pattern as creating the possibility of a “hyper-mobile planet” indicating that mobility is the greatest quality of the twentieth and twenty first centuries. From this sketch, it is no surprise that migration has influenced the pattern and existence of multiculturalism one way or the other. This tendency alone makes the modern state, that is, the host state, more volatile than ever before. This often leads to what one may call the overloading of the host state. Apart from making multiculturalism an official policy, the demands and rights based on the multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-religious trends found in such entity become not just crucial issues but controversial especially when it threatens what the nation-state is actually known for. For example, jobs that are needed to sustain the economy such as odd

manufacturing works but which are important are performed by these migrants but are rejected by citizens.

The contribution of migrants, though important, in this respect, to the host nations become a subject matter of debates and controversies which are fatal and have far reaching consequences on the state. One of such consequence is the requirement on the part of the state to ensure that cultural diversity is harmonised to create lasting civic and political cohesion. But then, on account of the imbalance between demands of international politics and global economic domination coupled with, in the face and phases of multiculturalism, what Samuel Huntington (1996) tagged as the clash of civilisation, both migration and multiculturalism leaves the state a huge responsibility of containing the resulting clashes and conflicts.

In a sense, therefore, global migration has a connection with citizenship concerns. Migration pattern all over the world is, in one sense or the other, a reflection of citizenship problems and travails that migrants are experiencing or had experienced while in their home country.<sup>25</sup> It is in this sense that we must understand what Stephen Castles means when he said that migration pattern challenges nation-state conception of citizenship. For Castles (1996, 51-76), migration possesses what he calls widening tendencies in the conceptualisation and re-conceptualisation of national citizenship. The state does not help in such matters since it is itself enmeshed in some form of conflict or the other based on citizenship dissension and disagreement. Such conflicting tendencies affect states response and treatment of migrants and non-citizens. Canefe (1998) describes such tendencies as having the possibility of creating an extensive definition of citizenship in consonance with the principles of global democracy.

For these scholars, migration creates conflicting tendencies in understanding of what national citizenship implies. Again, since an extensive programme of inclusion is made possible by the state in consonance with principles of democracy for migrants, denial and exclusion of certain rights of citizens on traditional or cultural grounds are resisted and thus leaves the state in a state of conflict with original citizens. This does not, however, remove the fact that the state, given the demands of a global order and internal awakenings, is enmeshed in a conglomeration of complex institutions engaged with each other in one form of conflict or the other to the detriments of migrants and minorities. This contradiction in the state's institutional network often creates feelings of alienation and exclusion as the case may be.

<sup>25</sup> For example, the number of Nigerian citizens who apply year in and year out for the American Visa Lottery is simply alarming. The exact figure may not be available on immediate demand. However, of the countries in the world where applications were received, the number of applicants from Nigeria is about four times the number of those from other countries. One explanation for this has to do with the fact that citizenship has not been institutionalized in the Nigerian context. In other words, absent in the Nigerian socio-political ecology is the programmatic impact of what Christopher Pierson (2004), Francis G. Castles (1996) and others call the 'existence of the welfare state'.

And what is more, globalisation and the politics of multinational expansion also reiterate the view that the state is a theatre of conflict rather than consent or contract.<sup>26</sup> Even though there are disagreements about the meaning of globalisation in the literature, scholars tend to see it, in the first place, as a complex and dramatic phenomenon based on its trend and impact. Those who, however, see globalisation as a new orientation and tendency in world politics do not seem to have a correct perspective to globalisation and the Enlightenment, in my estimation. This is because globalisation, in my thinking, is a continuous movement with the period of European Enlightenment basically because, apart from the major shift that the Enlightenment represented and projected, the aims and objectives of both globalisation and the Enlightenment appear arguably coincidental and, properly speaking, strikingly similar. Both are attempts to unite the world, perceive a sense of interconnectivity among nations all over the world. This is what the world seems to be singing now about globalisation.

It is in this sense that Scholte (2000) defined globalisation as the growth of superterritorial relations between people. One important effect of globalisation is that it reduces the weight of importance that is attached to the nation-state and, as a result, the conception of citizenship arising from it. Again, globalisation has a potentially weakening influence on the state itself and states' sovereignty in general. National policies which are sometimes defended on traditional and cultural values, and, that are of symbolic importance to such nation-states, are corrosively eroded by the onslaught of the globalising forces.

In a very poetic form, Phillip Bobbitt (2002) opined that globalisation has removed the nation-state with all the trappings of cultural and nationalistic sovereignty that it naturally has and has reduced it altogether to or replaced it with a market state. It means that in the language of globalisation, the state, traditionally known as the custodian of the national and symbolic pride that a society is known for ceases to possess these qualities and becomes nothing other than a market where mere exchange and commerce transpires. The state becomes an economic entity without any sense of moral, cultural and aesthetic values. It means the state can no longer be viewed in a normative sense. And as a market state, it shows that principles of economic profit become its running and reigning principles.

<sup>26</sup> The case of the Niger Delta in Nigeria can still be used to corroborate this point. The politics of multinational expansion is simply exploitative. Shell and the Nigerian State hardly operate by rules on account of the disrespect for citizenship rights, a factor that explains the incidence of conflict in the Niger Delta. Angola is also a case in point. The increase in the production of oil in that Sub-Saharan country has reawakened the interests of countries such as China and the US in the importing of oil from that conflict-ridden country. US and China share approximately 75 percent of Angolan oil exports. The unmitigated interests and the returns from such have been used in sponsoring the almost-three decades of civil war in that country. It is contended that oil has mortgaged the promotion of citizenship interests on account of the rise and safeguard of elitists' interests. See J. D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner (2001) and M. L. Ross (2001).

If we follow Bobbitt's analysis properly, what it means is that globalisation endorses one of the incredible instances of the mere commoditisation of the state where what matters is economics and profit making. This approach to the idea of the state has created the picture of amorality around the state which means that the state can no longer act as the true custodian of neutrality and fair play, a tendency that is not consistent with state theory especially when we fall back on the social contract or consent theory. The possibility is that the political economy of conflict becomes one of the diversionary tactics, ideology and strategy of the state.

In some other instances, the replacement and transition initiated by globalisation have created situations of military weakness, political instability, and economic insecurity especially in states where the conception of leadership have proven to be dynamic and resistant to the reductive and weakening tendencies inherent in globalisation. Inevitably, states subjected to this 'isolationism', courtesy of globalisation, have always had problems coping with the demands that are both internally generated and externally induced. The slogan that no national economy is an island has created rooms for uprising in states that desire to be unique especially in situations where demands and obligations towards citizens are not met due to the isolation package. Capacities to function and meet demands are often very low and such moments generate tension in the institutional framework of such states.

Dependency, realisable, is a very harsh conflictual context that most Third World countries especially postcolonial African countries have found themselves. The unbridled ambition to control state resources and the interests that multinational corporations have developed towards such resources like petroleum resources, oil and other natural resource are catalysts to the conflictual nature of modern states. States are engulfed in conflict all over the world such that we may not be committing an intellectual misnomer in saying that a global feat in the age of globalisation is multiplicities of conflicts. W. O. Alli's timely analysis and appraisal of globalisation and conflicts in Africa tends to give a warm support for the thesis propounded so far. In a fairly long passage, Alli (2006, 329-330) enthused that,

The end of the Cold War paved the way for the dramatic changes in the world. A world hitherto driven by the divisions of ideology was to be integrated by markets and technology. Structural adjustment and the logic of the market, debt crisis and marginalisation have all been intensified by this globalisation process and are also indicator of the process. They have all "down-sized the role of the state in economic management" thus undermining the capacity of the state for social provisioning. Yet, for African people, the role of the state is defined in developmental terms. Consequently, the interplay of economic crisis, social upheaval and political instability exposed the inadequacies of the African state and exacerbated the economic condition of the people who fall further into deprivations and desperation. In this situation, social and political misunderstanding quickly degenerate into conflicts.

Incidentally, no theory that is known to me seems to have a justifiable Pilatic philosophy exonerating the modern state from the theatrical instances of conflict in the twentieth and present centuries. And if it is reasoned that the science of conflictology attributed to the modern state is nothing but an exercise in personification, the supposed "misnomer" would not be mine alone considering that particular schools of idealism, with a modern example in Murray Bookchin (1982), see both history and the state as a rational order exhibiting a mind of its own.

### Conclusion

In concluding, it is important to contend that a lot seems to be impacting on postcolonial states especially in Africa and Latin American countries. This is not exactly informed by the crisis of conception on the meaning of postcolonialism but in the fact that the conditions of the postcolonial are underrated and, possibly, operates based on some freezing assumptions. Postcolonialism, as an ideology, indeed sought to challenge and displace the cultural superiority projected by imperial and colonial rule and in the process instil a sense of recognition and worth to non-western ideas, values and practices. But, at best, it remained simply ideological without any true reflection on the modern and anti-colonial condition of such postcolonial states.

It is in this sense that we have to agree that what postcolonialism did not actually foresightedly challenge and seek to dislodge was the context and circumstantiality of artificiality built around postcolonial states in general even though an emphasis on Africa is not out of place. It is this aura of artificiality around the state that often turns the state to a theatre of conflicts with the conflicts in turn, in the words of Samuel Egwu (2006, 407), retaining the verbiage of weakness and incoherence as veritable aspects and features of the state unable to manage the challenges of development and poverty. Inevitably, postcolonial state embodies certain contradictions by attempting to reflect the elements of the modern state when both are built and brought about by different historical conditions generating unique and peculiar conflict patterns.

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## Öz

### Modern Devletin Değişen Karakteri Üzerine Kuramsal Görüşler

Devlet kavramı, siyasi ve felsefi düşüncede merkezi ve önemli bir konudur. Ancak, devlet etrafında hem tarihsel hem de güncel gerçeklerle ilgili farklı ve çelişkili algılar vardır. Bu makale, devlet ile ilgili çağdaş algıların önemli birini ele almaktadır. Makale, modern devletin her ne kadar, teorik olarak, klasik filozof ve kuramcılar tarafından açıklandığı gibi, bir sözleşme ya da rıza teorisinden ortaya çıkmış olsa da bugünkü çağdaş durumunun, durağan bir çatışma ve çelişki hissinden etkilenmiş görüldüğünü savunmaktadır. Makale, vatandaşlık fikri, çoğu toplumlardaki çok kültürlü ve çoklu unsurlar, küresel göç oranının yüksek olması, çok uluslu açılımların siyaset ve felsefesi, ulus-devletin kapitalizmin aşırı desteği ile pazar-devlet haline geçişi ve küreselleşmenin yansımaları, özellikle Üçüncü Dünya ülkelerinde, modern devletin çatışmalı ve çelişkili doğası ile birbirlerini desteklemektedirler. Makale, modern devletin etrafındaki çatışmalı ve çelişkili göstergeler yukarıda vurgulanan faktörler de dahil olmak üzere ortaya çıkmasını etkilemiş olan tarihsel koşullar dışında izah edilemez sonucuna varmaktadır.

### Anahtar Kelimeler

Devlet, sözleşme, rıza, çatışma, insan doğası.

### About the Author

**Idowu William** obtained his doctoral degrees from Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife and University of Ibadan, Ibadan. Presently, Dr. Idowu William teaches philosophy at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria with special interests in Philosophy of law, Continental Philosophy and Socio-Political Philosophy. Idowu William's research products have gained seasoned expressions in several transnational epistemic fora such as *Politikon*, *Journal of Juridical Science*, *Law and Global Development*, *Cambrian Law Review*, *JPSL*, *NJAS*, *Doxa*, *Quest*, *Enter-Text*, and *Africa Development*. He is presently working on the Enlightenment's conception of human nature especially in relation to Africa.

### Yazar Hakkında

**Idowu William** doktora derecelerini Obafemi Awolowo Üniversitesi ve Ibadan Üniversitesi'nden almıştır. Dr. Idowu William Obafemi Awolowo Üniversitesi'nde özellikle Felsefe Hukuku, Kıta Avrupası Felsefesi ve Sosyo-Politik Felsefeye odaklanan felsefe dersleri vermektedir. Idowu William'ın yayınları *Politikon*, *Journal of Juridical Science*, *Law and Global Development*, *Cambrian Law Review*, *JPSL*, *NJAS*, *Doxa*, *Quest*, *Enter-Text* ve *Africa Development* gibi uluslararası dergilerde yayımlanmıştır. William Idowu halen Aydınlanmanın insan doğası kavramı üzerinde, özellikle Afrika'ya ilişkin olarak çalışmaktadır.